Introduction

The year 2025 has witnessed visible political and economic frictions in the India–U.S. relationship. Trade disputes over tariffs, the postponement of a Quad summit, and divergences over geopolitical priorities have created an impression of strain in bilateral ties. India’s concerns over U.S. policies towards China and Pakistan, and Washington’s discomfort over India’s energy engagement with Russia, have further added to the diplomatic unease. Yet, despite this surface-level turbulence, the India–U.S. partnership has not weakened in any fundamental sense. On the contrary, it continues to move forward, sustained by a dense web of institutional, bureaucratic, defence, and technological cooperation that operates largely independent of day-to-day political noise. This reveals a distinctive dual-track nature of the relationship, where volatility at the political level coexists with stability and continuity at the institutional level.

The Dual-Track Nature of India–U.S. Relations

• India–U.S. ties increasingly function on two parallel tracks.

• The first is a political track, shaped by:

  • Electoral cycles in both countries

  • Shifting domestic priorities

  • Trade negotiations and diplomatic signalling

• This track is inherently volatile and prone to periodic tensions and public disagreements.

• The second is an institutional track, driven by:

  • Defence establishments

  • Foreign and security bureaucracies

  • Technology agencies and strategic planners

• This track is far more stable and focuses on long-term strategic convergence in areas such as security, defence, technology, and infrastructure.

• Even when political engagement slows or becomes contentious, the institutional machinery continues to function and push cooperation forward.

Political and Economic Frictions in 2025

• Trade relations have come under strain due to:

  • U.S. tariffs on certain Indian goods

  • Disagreements over market access and regulatory barriers

• India’s exports to the U.S. reportedly declined sharply in 2025, reflecting these tensions.

• The U.S. has also expressed concerns over India’s continued purchases of Russian oil, linking energy choices to broader geopolitical considerations.

• From the Indian perspective:

  • Perceptions of a possible U.S.–China accommodation

  • Washington’s differentiated approach towards Pakistan
    have generated strategic unease.

• The postponement of high-level summits, including at the Quad level, reinforced the impression of a temporary political slowdown.

Institutional Resilience as the Real Backbone

• The real strength of the relationship lies in the institutionalisation of cooperation since the 2008 civil nuclear deal.

• Over the last decade and a half, defence, technology, and security cooperation have become deeply embedded in the bureaucratic and strategic systems of both countries.

• Even when top political leaders do not meet frequently, engagement continues through:

  • Foreign ministries

  • Defence ministries

  • National security establishments

  • Technical and scientific agencies

• This ensures continuity and prevents short-term political frictions from derailing the broader partnership.

Defence and Security Cooperation: The Core Pillar

• A dense web of agreements underpins defence cooperation between the two countries.

• This includes:

  • Foundational agreements such as LEMOA, COMCASA, and BECA, which facilitate logistics support, secure communications, and geospatial information sharing.

  • Defence innovation initiatives like INDUS-X and the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET), aimed at co-development and co-production.

  • Long-term defence framework agreements, most recently renewed in 2025, which focus on interoperability, information sharing, and deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.

• Regular joint military exercises such as:

  • Yudh Abhyas

  • Malabar

  • Tiger Triumph
    have built habits of cooperation and operational trust between the armed forces of both countries.

• This military-to-military engagement operates with a momentum of its own, largely insulated from political ups and downs.

Technology and Infrastructure Linkages

• Cooperation is no longer limited to defence and security.

• It now spans:

  • Space and scientific research

  • Semiconductors and critical technologies

  • Defence manufacturing and industrial partnerships

• Projects such as the NASA–ISRO NISAR mission symbolise deepening scientific and technological interdependence.

• Industrial defence deals and supply chain cooperation reflect a shared interest in:

  • Reducing dependence on China-centric ecosystems

  • Building trusted technology partnerships

• Quad-linked initiatives in:

  • Ports

  • Maritime infrastructure

  • Regional connectivity
    add an important Indo-Pacific dimension to this cooperation.

Quad as an Operational, Not Merely Symbolic, Platform

• Even when leadership-level Quad summits are delayed or rescheduled, the working-level machinery continues to function.

• Quad working groups remain active in areas such as:

  • Maritime domain awareness

  • Critical and emerging technologies

  • Counter-terrorism

  • Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief

• The focus is gradually shifting:

  • From symbolism and signalling

  • To practical cooperation and regional public goods

• This reinforces the idea that the Quad, and India–U.S. cooperation within it, is becoming more institutionalised and less dependent on summit-level optics.

Why the Relationship Remains Strong

• Institutional continuity acts as a shock absorber against political volatility.

• Bureaucratic mechanisms, defence establishments, and technical agencies:

  • Sustain dialogue

  • Advance projects

  • Keep long-term plans on track
    even when political engagement slows.

• This makes the relationship more resilient and less vulnerable to abrupt policy shifts or temporary disagreements.

Challenges on the Horizon

• Trade disputes and regulatory differences remain a significant drag on the relationship.

• Divergences over:

  • Data governance

  • Technology regulation

  • Market access
    may continue to limit full-spectrum cooperation.

• Concerns over the depth and terms of technology sharing, especially in sensitive sectors, also persist.

Way Forward

• The next phase of the partnership must:

  • Deepen institutional understanding beyond defence into economic, technological, and people-centric domains.

• Broader cooperation in:

  • Education

  • Research

  • Supply chains

  • Skilled mobility
    can create wider constituencies that support the relationship.

• Building trust across more sectors will ensure that the partnership can:

  • Withstand future political downturns

  • Remain stable even in periods of geopolitical uncertainty

Conclusion

The India–U.S. relationship today is best understood as a partnership running on parallel tracks. While the political track remains subject to periodic turbulence, the institutional track—anchored in defence, technology, and strategic cooperation—provides stability, continuity, and long-term direction. It is this quiet but robust machinery of bureaucratic and strategic engagement that ensures the relationship does not drift or collapse when headlines turn negative. In an era of global uncertainty, this institutional resilience may well prove to be the most valuable asset of the India–U.S. partnership.